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1 Abstract 
This research investigates how institutional carriers – from rules and power systems to cognitive schemas 
and information technology – influence the reproduction of centralized decision-making governance 
structures in virtual communities. Studying a group of four virtual communities, the findings show that 
community members invoke a variety of institutional carriers in order to try to legitimate actual 
centralized governance structures, which contradict their stated intentions of building decentralized 
decision making. The research illustrates in the micro-level how an institutionalized social structure is 
seen as meaningful by social actors in spite of being the opposite of what community members would 
rhetorically defend. The study explores how institutional carriers become sanction and legitimating 
mechanisms, which influence the reproduction of institutionalized behavior in virtual interactions, 
concluding on the relevance of understanding the institutional context to make sense of behavior patterns, 
which emerge from interactions in online environments in general and virtual communities in particular. 
Keywords: virtual community; governance structures; decision making; institutions; institutional 
carriers. 
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1 Introduction 
The centralization of decision making is a pervasive institution in hierarchical organizations (Simon, 1997 
[1945]). Some virtual communities reproduce this social structure, whilst others enact models which 
resemble more participatory democracy structures, in which all members could participate in decision 
making (Graham, 1999; Jones, 1995). However, some authors question whether one can find an actual 
example of a network organization considering the pervasiveness of hierarchical organizations in 
contemporary societies (Courpasson and Reed, 2004). Starting from the perspective that virtual 
communities may adopt centralized or decentralized decision-making process, this research investigates 
how the institutional environment influences governance structures in virtual communities. 
Reviewing the literature on virtual (online) communities, few studies focus primarily on the influence of 
institutions in such online collectives (Hercheui, 2011); for instance, how institutions influence the 
emergence of norms in online communities (Matzat, 2004) and how groupware tools institutionalize the 
governance mechanisms of virtual communities (de Souza et al., 2004). This research thus contributes to 
filling this gap in the understanding of the influence of institutions in virtual environments. 
From an institutional perspective, organizational identities, structures and activities result from 
institutionalized patterns, which determine the validity of types of organizations, their appropriate 
structural forms and legitimate activities (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott and Meyer, 1994). 
Organizational structures are not only the product of private actors, guided by individual-rational choice 
and interests (neoclassical economics), but also the product of societies which provide resources for 
legitimate organizational patterns (Jepperson and Meyer, 1991; March and Simon, 1993 [1958]; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1991; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
A perspective to understand the influence of institutions in the structuring of organizations is to observe 
the role of institutional carriers – such as rules, norms and cognitive models – as vehicles and repositories 
of institutionalized features (Scott, 2001). Weber (2002 [1930]) introduced the concept of institutional 
carrier proposing that social strata, groups and organizations were responsible for the diffusion of 
religious values through societies. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) associate institutional carriers, such as 
legislation, to institutional isomorphism, i.e. the reproduction of similar social structures through settings. 
Many scholars have explored the role of legal systems, organizational models, professionals, universities, 
science, media, and technology as institutional carriers (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Kraatz and Moore, 
2002; Scott, 2001, 2008). 
Investigating the diffusion and reproduction of institutions, Scott (2001) proposes a framework with 
twelve categories of institutional carriers. This research draws upon this framework, proposing to 
contribute to the theoretical understanding of the role of institutional carriers in the reproduction of 
institutions in virtual environments. Scott’s framework is chosen because it is a generic classification that 
may be applied in diverse environments. Other studies on institutional carriers have centered in particular 
cases, without providing a categorization that could be generalized to other situations. 
This study explores how institutional carriers influence a group of virtual communities, understood as 
informal, voluntary organizations, in the reproduction of centralized decision making. As these 
communities interact mainly through Internet-mediated channels, the settings offer an opportunity to 
understand how centralized decision making is reproduced in online environments; and the influence of 
institutional carriers in this reproduction. This study thus may inform other researchers who investigates 
governance structures in virtual teams, collaborative environments, and all sorts of communities. 
Although focusing on institutional carriers, which highlight the role of social structures in the 
reproduction of institutions, this study does not exclude agency from this process. Indeed, some authors 
criticize institutional theory for focusing on social structures instead of agency. However, this criticism 
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comes from a limited view of institutional theory. Agency is clearly important in the creation, diffusion 
and reproduction of institutions, as people are permanently making choices about reproducing or 
changing social structures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Douglas, 1987; Jepperson and Meyer, 1991; 
Scott, 2001). On the one hand, social structures influence agents in the reproduction of institutions, but on 
the other hand social structures depend on agency to be reproduced or changed (Scott 2001). This 
research copes with this permanent interplay between agency and social structures, focusing on the micro-
level reproduction of an institutionalized structure (Powell and Colyvas, 2008), to explore how social 
actors invoke institutional carriers in order to build and explain the governance structures of their virtual 
communities. 
This article develops as follows. First, it introduces the theoretical framework of institutional carriers. 
Second, it presents the methodology and empirical objects of this investigation. Third, it describes the 
findings. Fourth, it discusses the findings through the lens of institutional theory, clarifying the theoretical 
insights the study brings to the surface. Finally, the article outlines the theoretical and empirical 
contributions of this investigation, and suggests further research. 
2 Institutional carriers 
This study understands institutions as resilient social structures, i.e. social patterned behavior that diffuse 
through settings (Berger and Luckmann, 1967 [1966]; Scott, 2001). When typified actions are repeated 
through time, they become institutions (Berger and Luckmann, 1967 [1966]). Institutions influence social 
actors, fostering the reproduction of patterned behavior. The main institutional channels of influence on 
human behavior are regulative and normative systems (rules and norms), and cultural-cognitive systems 
(models, scripts and schemas) (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott, 2001; Scott and Meyer, 1994). 
Scott (2001) proposes that institutions are constituted by regulative, normative and culture-cognitive 
systems. Each of these systems has specific institutional carriers, classified into four groups: symbolic 
systems, relational systems, routines and artifacts. Institutional carriers influence the diffusion and 
reproduction of institutions (patterned behaviors). Table 1 presents examples of carriers for each category. 
 
 
Carriers 
Pillars 
Regulative Normative Cultural-cognitive 
Symbolic systems Rules  
Laws 
Values 
Expectations 
Categories 
Typifications, Schemas 
Relational systems Governance systems 
Power systems 
Regimes 
Authority systems 
Structural isomorphism 
Identities 
Routines Protocols 
Standard operating 
procedures 
Jobs  
Roles  
Obedience to duty 
Scripts 
Artifacts Objects complying with 
mandated specifications 
Objects meeting 
conventions, standards 
Objects possessing 
symbolic value 
Table 1. Framework on institutional carriers (Scott, 2001: 77). 
Symbolic systems (rules, values and schemas) are present in the mind as ideas and values; they are 
simultaneously external to actors and internalized by actors as cognitive frames and beliefs. Relational 
systems (governance and authority systems, and identities) are related to role structures, i.e. patterned 
expectations people cultivate through being embedded in social networks. Routines are patterned actions 
and procedures (repetitive activities). Lastly, artifacts are tangible objects, such as information 
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technology, which have material specifications but are interpreted and appropriated by people in different 
ways, depending on conventions and symbolic values associated with them. 
The framework has a level of granularity (by category and by carrier) that facilitates the micro-level 
investigation of institutionalizing processes (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1992). The framework helps revealing 
how people recall specific institutional carriers to explain the centralized decision making in virtual 
communities, in which members stated the commitment with decentralized decision-making models. 
The diffusion and reproduction of institutions are supported by the perception of legitimacy. In this study, 
legitimacy is understood as the perception that specific actions are appropriate and meaningful within a 
social system (North, 1998; Scott, 2001; Suchman, 1995). Legitimacy depends on conformity to formal 
rules (regulative systems), to moral bases (normative systems) and to taken-for-granted frames of 
reference (cultural-cognitive systems) (Berger and Luckmann, 1967 [1966]; Deephouse and Suchman, 
2008; Scott, 2001). Social actors may conform to institutions in order to obtain legitimacy and thus 
increase their chances of obtaining resources from society (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
In addition, institutions depend on sanction (reward and punishment) mechanisms (Scott, 2001). In 
regulative and normative systems, powerful actors control mechanisms that support the reproduction of 
institutions: judicial systems may impose punishment; society enforces informal constraints such as 
signals of disapproval (North, 1998; Scott, 1994). In cognitive systems, the way situations and identities 
are defined (frame of mind) controls behaviors (Berger and Luckmann, 1967 [1966]; Scott, 1994). 
3 Methodology 
This study aims to understand how institutions, through institutional carriers, influence the process of 
reproduction of centralized decision making in a group of virtual communities. Drawing upon the 
interpretive tradition, this investigation explores the meaning people ascribe to their interactions (Berger 
and Luckmann, 1967 [1966]; Gadamer, 1989 [1975]). The data collection method is in-depth, semi-
structured interviews with 58 community members in 2006 (Esterberg, 2002; Mason, 2002). 
Interviewees were chosen through a snow-ball process: the first contact was with spokespeople, referred 
to in communities’ websites; these participants recommended other members, and these others 
successively (Esterberg, 2002). The snow-ball process has limitations, as the sample may be biased (only 
referred people have been interviewed). However, the repetition of same information coming from a 
variety of members (confirming the enactment of centralized decision making, and the influence of 
specific institutional carriers) reduces the risk of having relied on untruth information. Even leaders, who 
would like to protect their position, have confirmed the centralized decision making and the conflicts 
among members and leaders related to this sort of social structure. This improves the reliability of the 
findings.  
The transcriptions were coded through consecutive rounds, in order to guarantee the logical consistency 
of findings (Gadamer, 1989 [1975]; Mason, 2002; Rubin and Rubin, 2005). The initial coding was 
flexible, although grounded in Scott’s framework (2001), following a theory-driven approach (Rubin and 
Rubin, 2005). Through successive comparisons between the code and the transcripts, a final code was 
defined, and again contrasted with the data in order to guarantee that each suggested carrier was widely 
present in the interviews. The validity of the study is supported by two facts: (i) constructs (category of 
carriers) were cross-checked among many interviewees, showing a level of saturation; and (ii) the final 
constructs formed a consistent corpus that is coherent with institutional theory (Gadamer, 1989 [1975]; 
Mason, 2002; Rubin and Rubin, 2005). 
The findings bring second-level constructs, built by this researcher through interpreting the first-level 
constructs presented by interviewees (Schutz, 1962). In face of the limited size of this paper, very few 
quotations (first-level constructs) from interviewees have been added. 
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This investigation focuses on four Brazilian environmental-education virtual communities, as listed below 
(membership numbers refer to the general discussion lists in 2006): 
• Rebea (Brazilian Environmental-Education Network): has been active at the national level since 
1992 (380 members). 
• Repea (São Paulo Environmental-Education Network): has been active in the State of São Paulo 
since 1992 (around 560 members). 
• Remtea (Mato Grosso Environmental-Education Network): has been active in the State of Mato 
Grosso since 1996 (around 200 members). 
• Reasul (Brazilian South-Region Environmental-Education Network): has been active since 2002 
in three states of South Brazil (around 2,000 members). 
These networks are considered communities as it is possible to define their boundaries in accordance with 
established common interests, common rules of interaction, and voluntary participation (Graham, 1999). 
These collectives are informal organizations, however membership is not anonymous. Their activity is 
concentrated on distributing news and organizing collective political demonstrations and petitions. 
These communities were chosen for two reasons. First, they offer interesting settings for understanding 
how institutional carriers influence virtual environments as their main interaction channels are discussion 
lists. Second, some members centralize decision making in these collectives, although these communities 
have the ideal, at least in the rhetorical level, of constructing decentralized governance structures. 
Aware of the contrast between the ideal (decentralized) and actual models (centralized) (informed by a 
pilot research), this investigation started each interview questioning why communities adopted the name 
networks. In this part, members have mainly explored their ideals of having decentralized decision 
making. Sequentially, interviewees were motivated to describe actual decision making. When elements of 
centralization appeared in their descriptions, the researcher asked the reasons behind adopting a practice 
which challenged the ideal model described beforehand. From the contrast between the model they would 
like to have (decentralized) and the model they actually have (centralized), members have recalled 
institutional carriers that influence their online behavior.  
In these communities, some members (called here leaders) have access to segregated discussion lists in 
which ordinary members are not allowed. Leaders centralize decision making mainly through interacting 
on these leadership discussion lists. These lists are somehow a blurred governance structure: many 
ordinary members do not know that leaders make decisions through these channels, defining, for instance, 
who may represent the community at events, who moderates discussion lists and who publishes on their 
websites. These are examples of centralized decisions which affect the whole community. 
4 Findings 
Carriers Pillars 
Regulative Normative Cultural-cognitive 
Symbolic 
systems  
Legislation * Expectations from society and 
community members  
Hierarchical schemas 
Relational 
systems 
Power systems Authority systems Identities 
Routines Segregation by type of 
membership 
Jobs and roles Scripts defining community roles 
Artifacts Internet tools embed 
technical features 
Internet tools follow 
standardized configurations 
Internet tools are believed to be less 
efficient communication means 
Table 1. Institutional carriers: Brazilian virtual communities (* only observed in Rebea, Repea 
and Reasul). 
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Table 2 summarizes the institutional carriers which are identified by community members as being related 
to the centralized decision-making structures the collectives have developed through time. The findings 
are presented in an aggregate format for the four communities, because the interpretations that emerged 
from each community are very similar. When the difference is relevant, it is pointed out. 
4.1 Symbolic systems 
In the regulative level, the Brazilian government has offered special funding to environmental-education 
virtual communities aiming to motivate them to appropriate Internet-mediated channels. Three of the 
studied communities (Rebea, Repea and Reasul) received money from the government through specific 
legislation (Fundo Nacional do Meio Ambiente), at the beginning of the 2000s. 
As the studied collectives are informal organizations, they could not be held accountable by a contract. In 
order to solve this problem, the government allowed a formal organization (called anchor) to assume the 
representation of each community in funded projects. This anchor organization signed the contract, 
becoming accountable for the money and the project goals. Although the legislation did not interfere in 
community governance structures, anchor organizations adopted centralized decision making arguing that 
otherwise they could not comply with contracts. As explained by a member: 
“The legislation established that the community should have a management group. Before this 
funded project, the community did not differentiate between members [leaders and others].” 
In the normative level, expectations affect communities’ governance structures. First, society and donors 
expected communities to have formal representatives to negotiate agreements. Second, community 
members expected  some participants to assume the community management of community. In practice, 
ordinary members lose power in decision making once the community accept that a few members are 
formal representatives. Members who have formal roles become community spokespeople and 
gatekeepers, acquiring status of legitimate authority. 
In the cultural-cognitive level, community leaders drew upon hierarchical organizational models to 
organize collective action. These hierarchical schemas emerged from interviews as a taken-for-granted 
perception of how decisions are made in organizations, either because this is the way processes are 
organized in society or because respondents cannot imagine a way of making decisions in a more 
democratic structure. A member explains: 
“Social relations in our society are hierarchical, with people who give orders and people who 
follow orders. It is difficult to try to change this structure.” 
In this research, the term hierarchical schema implies only that members have different degrees of power 
in decision making, a meaning which emerged from the interviews. The term hierarchy has many other 
complex meanings that are not explored in this paper. 
4.2 Relational systems 
In the regulative level, power systems influence communities through interactions with actual and 
potential sponsors. Main community leaders were those who were directly associated with communities’ 
sponsors (universities, government and NGOs), being able to obtain and control resources for the 
communities. As related by a member: 
“Civil society organizations face this drama: who sponsors also directs the community activities. 
The problem is not to receive money, but to have [or not] independence in using the funding.” 
Sponsors also influenced the communities’ governance for interacting only with certain members. 
Government officials, for instance, held conversations only with a few leaders, affecting how the 
collectives perceived the legitimacy and authority of these leaders, vis-à-vis ordinary members. 
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In the normative level, reputation and status in society, such as being government officers, NGO leaders 
and academics, are translated into legitimacy in the studied collectivities. Authority in society is brought 
to the communities because members know each other (membership is not anonymous). In practice, 
members who had more authority in society more easily assumed leadership in the communities, as 
explained by a member: 
“The status outside the community should be respected inside the community. The list should 
have people that are able to discern.” 
In the cultural-cognitive level, community leaders cultivated the idea of sharing a common identity 
(history, values and ideas), differentiating themselves from ordinary members. For some leaders, this 
feeling of identity justified splitting the community into two groups: leaders, who were historically 
committed with community principles and were thus legitimate decision makers, and those who did not 
have the same level of commitment (ordinary members). 
4.3 Routines 
In the regulative level, leaders segregated ordinary members from decision making. In hierarchical 
organizations, this is a standard procedure that supports centralized decision making (Simon, 1997 
[1945]). In practice, this procedure means that ordinary members are not accepted in leadership 
discussion lists, in which decision are made. 
The segregation of people from decision making has similarities and differences in relation to the carrier 
hierarchical schemas. Hierarchical schemas legitimate the idea that some members (leaders) have more 
power in decision making than others (ordinary members), but they do not define who belongs to each 
category. The segregation by type of membership, however, stresses the roles in decision making: by 
definition those excluded from segregated discussion lists are not leaders and do not make decisions. 
In the normative level, formal jobs and roles in society influenced the way members behaved in the 
community: members interacted in a way that was coherent with their social roles. Jobs and roles favored 
the centralization of decisions because members avoided disputing the centralization of decision making 
with their bosses or academic supervisors (or potential future bosses or academic supervisors). A member 
explains this relationship between online and offline environments: 
“If you belong to an institution, you should say what is convenient to say. If I were a government 
representative, I would say that everything was marvelous [about policies on environment]. 
When you are member of an institution, you represent this institution.” 
In the cultural-cognitive level, titles such as ‘executive secretary’ and ‘moderator’ influenced how 
members understood the role of those who had assumed these positions in the communities. 
Independently of being informed about the responsibilities of these roles, participants understood these 
scripts considering the commonsensical meaning of these words. In creating membership categories, 
scripts reinforce the legitimacy of some members to centralize decision making, as summarized by a 
member: 
“When the community defines the role of an executive secretary, it implies power and 
responsibilities, the roles that people should develop.” 
4.4 Artifacts 
In the regulative level, websites and discussion lists have material features (technical specifications) 
which permitted certain members to appropriate their control. The websites were protected by passwords 
and only those who had the password could publish in these channels, thus centralizing the decision 
making related to which content is to be published. The discussion lists give special powers to their 
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creators, who may delete the list, include and exclude members, moderate messages and delegate power 
to others. The creator and delegates (moderators) had more power than other members, thus allowing the 
segregation of decision making. These features are embedded in the tools, during design, as explained by 
a member: 
“The Yahoo! [discussion list] differentiates its creator from other members. This person may 
delegate power to moderators.” 
In the regulative level (above), design allows some members to appropriate the tools and centralize 
decision making. Although the same tools may be configured in different forms, in these communities, 
websites and discussion lists were configured in a conventional way to keep leaders controlling these 
tools, favoring centralized decision making. In the normative level, the conventional configuration of 
Internet tools influenced communities in centralizing decision making.  
Leaders controlled the publishing on the websites, through restricting password access. They also 
controlled discussion lists: they made a few members moderators, and kept the leadership discussion lists 
closed to ordinary members, through configuring the tool to demand approval of membership. These are 
conventional, widespread configurations, but leaders could have chosen otherwise. 
In the cultural-cognitive level, different values and beliefs are associated to technology in these 
communities. Considering the interest of this research, it is notable that some interviewees emphasized 
the idea that Internet tools are less efficient than face-to-face interaction in communication processes. 
This symbolic value is not surprising: research confirms face-to-face communication is more efficient to 
solve complex tasks (Daft et al., 1987). However, this belief calls attention in the context of these 
communities, as discussion lists were their main communication channel, and communities do not have 
frequent face-to-face meetings (once a month in the best case, and in Rebea it may take years). 
Cross-checking this belief with the context in which it emerges, a new meaning becomes clearer. 
Respondents (mainly leaders) argued that Internet tools were less efficient than face-to-face 
communication especially when denying using general discussion lists for decision making. Interviewees 
did not make the same association, however, when discussing leadership discussion lists as space for 
decision making. In practice, this symbolic value is recalled mainly when leaders feel the need of 
undermining the legitimacy of general discussion, without questioning leadership discussion lists. As a 
member summarizes: 
“There is a polemic about the existence of the leadership discussion list. I do not know who is 
member of this list, and what they debate. I think the majority of [ordinary] members do not know 
about this segregated list. It is hidden.” 
5 Discussion 
This research investigates the influence of institutionalized governance structures in virtual communities. 
The findings suggest that institutional carriers influence social actors in the reproduction of centralized 
decision making in the studied communities. Although members stated the intention of building network 
governance structures, they admitted that centralized decision making was pervasive in practice, and 
recalled related institutional carriers when explaining their centralized practice vis-à-vis their ideal 
models. This section discusses these findings, arguing that institutional carriers are perceived by 
respondents as legitimating and sanctions mechanisms, which justify reproducing centralized structures. 
Drawing upon findings and the proposed framework (Scott, 2001), table 3 summarizes how each of the 
observed carriers influenced the communities. The carriers function as legitimating and sanction 
mechanisms, complementing each other in the direction of fostering the differentiation between leaders 
and ordinary members, and in providing models and resources to support centralized decision making. 
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Carriers Pillars 
Regulative Normative Cultural-cognitive 
Symbolic 
systems  
Legislation * 
The law empowered and 
legitimated members who were 
linked to the anchor organization 
in relation to others, favoring 
centralization of decision making 
in the projects which received 
governmental funding, model that 
was also reproduced in other 
community interactions. 
Expectations from society and 
members 
Society and members expected 
the collectives to have 
representatives, who were 
empowered and legitimated as 
gatekeepers and spokespeople. 
Communities legitimated 
themselves in society by 
having these representatives. 
Hierarchical schemas 
Members took for granted the 
appropriateness and efficiency of 
hierarchical schemas in which 
some (leaders) have more power 
in decision making than others, in 
spite of the incoherence between 
this model and their ideal of 
building network organizations. 
Relational 
systems 
Power systems 
Members related to sponsors had 
more power in decision making. 
Sponsors influenced how 
members perceived the 
legitimacy of leaders as decision 
makers. 
Authority systems 
Members who had more 
reputation and status in society 
transferred their authority to 
the virtual interactions as 
legitimated leaders and 
decision-makers. 
Identities 
Leaders cultivated a common 
identity, differentiating 
themselves (and their role) from 
ordinary members, in order to 
legitimate them as decision 
makers. 
Routines Segregation by type of 
membership 
Leaders enforced the segregation 
of ordinary members from 
decision making, not allowing 
their participation in the 
leadership discussion lists. 
Jobs and roles 
Fear of sanctions made 
members avoid questioning 
their bosses and academic 
supervisors about the 
centralization of decision 
making (and other themes) in 
the virtual interactions. 
Scripts defining community roles 
Members understood that those 
with titles in the community – 
such as executive secretary and 
moderator – were empowered and 
legitimated in relation to others. 
Artifacts Internet tools embed technical 
features 
Websites and discussion lists had 
technical, material features which 
permitted leaders to control these 
channels, favoring the 
centralization of decision making, 
thus enforcing the exclusion of 
ordinary members. 
Internet tools follow 
standardized configurations 
Leaders configured websites 
and discussion lists in a 
conventional way, in order to 
keep the centralized control of 
these Internet channels, thus 
enforcing the exclusion of 
ordinary members from 
decision making. 
Internet tools are believed to be 
less efficient communication 
means 
Members (mainly leaders) 
cultivate the rhetorical value that 
general discussion lists are not 
efficient channels for decision 
making, to legitimate the 
exclusion of ordinary members 
from decisions. 
Table 3. The influence of institutional carriers (* only observed in Rebea, Repea and Reasul). 
Influenced by carriers, members attributed meaning and legitimacy to roles and forms of agency 
(actorhood) in their communities. Members accept models in which some have more power in decision 
making (hierarchical schemas). Those who have power believe it is legitimate to segregate others from 
decision making (segregation by type of membership). The legislation also differentiates among members, 
and society and members have expectations that some members should assume the representation and 
leadership in the communities. The entitlement of some members as executive secretaries and moderators 
(scripts defining community roles) also legitimize the role of leaders in relation to other participants. 
These cited carriers legitimize the idea that some have more power, but they do not define who has more 
power. This is the function of other carriers. Power systems influence participants in the direction of 
legitimizing the leadership of specific members: those who are strongly related to communities’ sponsors. 
Similarly, authority systems legitimize as leaders those who have greater reputations and status in the 
10   
field of environmental education. In addition, members reproduce social structures they are used to in 
offline environments for fear of questioning, in virtual interactions, those who have some level of power 
over them in their lives, such as their bosses and academic supervisors (jobs and roles). Finally, leaders 
cultivate a value that they have an identity that differentiates them from others, such as the belief that they 
are more committed to the community. Leaders use this sense of identity to justify their role as decision 
makers, which contradicts the objective of creating network organizations. 
The symbolic value that Internet tools are believed to be less efficient communication means influences 
the legitimacy of the leadership group because of the contextual environment in which these communities 
emerge. The idea that face-to-face meetings are more efficient as communication channels does not 
legitimize the centralization of decision making. It becomes a legitimating mechanism, however, in the 
context in which this argument is used to justify that general discussion lists are not channels for decision 
making, meanwhile the segregated discussion lists are. In this context, the cited symbolic value is a 
rhetorical device used to justify the exclusion of ordinary members from decision making. 
Institutional carriers are also sanction mechanisms, especially because interactions are not anonymous. 
The legislation provides reward and punishment mechanisms through offering funding and demanding 
accountability. The same happens with power systems: sponsors may both reward acceptable behavior by 
funding projects, or punish inadequate action by denying resources. In addition, the logic applies to jobs 
and roles: members may be punished or rewarded in their offline interactions for their online behavior. 
In the studied context, Internet tools (websites and discussion lists) function as enforcement mechanisms 
by means of framing the opportunities of action: ordinary members may neither participate in leadership 
discussion lists, nor publish on websites. IT artifacts have specifications which offer a level of flexibility, 
allowing different configurations and appropriation. In these communities, the level of enforcement is 
stronger because leaders followed conventions in the configuration of these tools, fostering centralized 
decision making. These communities adopt Internet tools and forms of configuration which permit the 
reproduction of such model. Other tools and configurations could foster different models of interaction. 
The findings reveal that different institutional carriers work together to support the same patterned 
behavior. When questioned about the reasons for adopting centralized decision making, respondents 
evoked explanations related to different carriers. Sometimes they recalled carriers to support the 
legitimacy of their behavior, considering taken-for-granted beliefs in society. At other times, they 
associated carriers with sanction (enforcement) mechanisms: specific behavior should be reproduced 
considering the social context. It is possible to observe the influence of individual carriers as well as the 
way they work together for supporting centralized decision making. By analytical reasons, it is convenient 
to understand the mechanisms behind each carrier, although in practice these mechanisms work closely to 
each other. 
In the studied communities, in spite of aiming to build decentralized decision making, a process to be 
created, the communities reproduced a more centralized model. Although institutions may change through 
time, they also have a high level of inertia. The interdependence between social agents, the cognitive 
difficulty of creating alternatives to taken-for-granted schemas, and the fact that powerful social actors 
have interests in keeping current institutions may foster institutional inertia (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; 
March and Olsen 1989; Powell 1991; Stinchcombe 1968). 
Community members recalled institutional carriers which reflect the interdependence between their 
virtual collectives and society. Institutional carriers permit to analyze in the micro-level the offline 
elements which support online governance structures, pointing out the relevance of the institutional 
environment when studying social structures observed in virtual communities and interactions. 
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6 Conclusion 
Starting from an institutional perspective, this research explores how institutional carriers influence the 
reproduction of centralized decision making in a group of virtual communities. In following this strategy, 
this research contributes to reduce the gap in the research literature related to the understanding of how 
institutional environments influence patterns of interaction in virtual communities. 
This study shows that Scott’s (2001) framework is helpful to explore the process of institutionalization in 
the micro-level: avoiding abstract approaches on institutionalization, it is easier to observe how social 
actors interpret the influence of institutional carriers in their behavior (Czarniawska-Joerges 1992; Powell 
and Colyvas 2008). For instance, actors associated their behavior with specific social constructs, such as 
rules, roles, models and identities, and acknowledged the role of technology in influencing their virtual 
interactions. In addition, the paper demonstrates that the framework is applicable to virtual environments. 
From a theoretical perspective, this research proposes that furthermore being repositories of social 
structures, institutional carriers may be also interpreted as sanction and legitimating mechanisms. In this 
study, institutional carriers influence the reproduction of institutionalized social structures because they 
legitimate and enforce patterned behaviors. In addition, the research points out that a patterned behavior is 
supported simultaneously by many institutional carriers, revealing the complexity of choices (agency) 
behind the enactment of social structures.  
The research reveals that although the framework focuses on the structural side of reproducing patterned 
behaviors, the perspective on institutional carriers indirectly also uncovers the relevance of agency. Thus 
although this article focuses on institutional carriers, agency is pervasive as emerged in the arguments to 
justify the reproduction of centralized decision making in collectives which aim to enact decentralized 
governance structures. For instance, social actors decided which Internet tools and forms of configuration 
they have adopted. Then these tools and configurations have become carriers of centralized decision 
making in these virtual environments for the action of these actors in the level of choosing technology, 
defining its configuration and constructing social values related to the tools. 
For practitioners, this study shows that the kind of interaction which emerges in virtual environments may 
be closely related to patterned interactions observed in offline interactions. The paper clarifies that the 
centralization of decision making in the studied communities is greatly influenced by the hierarchical 
organizational model. Thus attempts to create new virtual environments – such as virtual teams, 
collaborative interactions and all sorts of communities – should take into account the context in which 
such online collectives emerge. The intention of creating new forms of interaction in virtual environments 
may not be successful if not supported by broader institutional structures. 
Lastly, this investigation opens questions that deserve further research. This study suggests that carriers 
contribute to build the legitimacy of a patterned behavior, but it is not clear which carriers have been 
more important in this process. Further research may try to ponder the strength of some carriers in relation 
to others. Further research may also investigate carriers in different settings, in order to explore whether 
there are patterns through settings relating specific carriers to sanction and/or legitimating mechanisms. 
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